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ABSTRACT
In this article, Lithuania's relations with Russia from 2004 to 2014 are examined. This analysis is not 
much of a challenge in itself: there have been no significant changes in the overall quality of the two 
countries' relations, no new issues of disagreement, and the countries' approaches to each other have also 
remained unchanged. This analysis is significant in a different way—relations with Russia motivate 
and induce Lithuania's entire foreign policy arena, from its strategies to the country's everyday debates. 
Understanding Lithuania's relations with Russia leads to insights regarding Lithuania's geopolitical 
thinking and how Lithuania represents itself. Therefore, in this article, the goal is to demonstrate that 
an analysis of Lithuanian-Russian relations since 2004 not only explains Lithuanian foreign policy, but 
also reveals an enduring and negative stability in bilateral relations notwithstanding constant turbulence 
and quarrels.
Keywords: Lithuania’s foreign policy, Lithuanian-Russian relations, regional security, energy security, 
politics of history, Kaliningrad Oblast.
INTRODUCTION
Relations with Russia are among the most problematic of Lithuania’s bilateral foreign 
relations. In this article, I examine Lithuania’s relations with Russia since the spring of 2004, 
when Lithuania reached two foreign policy milestones: membership in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and in the European Union (EU). In the spring of 2004, Lithuania’s 
foreign policy makers were openly optimistic about the country’s geopolitical environment 
and the possibility of engaging with Russia in various European and transatlantic relationships 
(Valionis, 2004; Agreement of Political Parties, 2004). The implicit security assumptions of 
these foreign policy makers was that Lithuania would not have to worry as much about 
national security and that the country’s membership in these two powerful institutions would 
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make its international relations problems easier to solve. These wishful assumptions proved 
to be unfounded. Russia was, and remains, Lithuania’s most hostile neighbour. As of 2015, 
Russia has proven alarming and difficult for Lithuania to trust. 
An evaluation and analysis of Russia and Lithuania’s relations over the last ten years, from 
2004 to 2014, is not much of a challenge in itself: there have been no significant changes 
in the overall quality of the two countries’ relations, no new issues of disagreement, and 
the countries’ approaches to each other have also remained unchanged. But this analysis 
of bilateral relations is significant in a different way—relations with Russia motivate and 
induce Lithuania’s entire foreign policy arena, from its strategies to the country’s everyday 
debates. An understanding of Lithuanian-Russian relations leads to a better understanding of 
Lithuania’s geopolitical thinking and how Lithuania represents itself. 
Therefore, in this article, my goal is to demonstrate that an analysis of Lithuanian-Russian 
relations since 2004 not only explains Lithuanian foreign policy, but also reveals an enduring 
and negative stability in bilateral relations notwithstanding constant turbulence and quarrels. 
How have Lithuanian-Russian relations remained tense for a decade? 
The article proceeds in five sections. First, I review the research and the topics defining 
bilateral foreign relations between Russia and Lithuania until 2004. Next, I identify the most 
significant events in the two countries’ relations during the decade spanning from 2004 to 
2014. These significant events reveal dominant relation stabilization practices. Further, I 
focus on the nexus between history and energy in the two country’s relations. I also analyse 
images of Russia in Lithuania. Finally, I evaluate the impact of the decade’s principal structural 
change—Lithuania’s EU and NATO membership—on Lithuania-Russia relations, by showing 
how instability stabilizes Lithuanian-Russian relations. Specific political practices establish and 
enable a stable structure of Lithuanian-Russian relations. These stabilizing political practices 
and the unsuccessful attempts to change them constitute the focus of this article.
1. REVIEWING, ANALYSING, AND QUESTIONING RELATIONS BET WEEN  
LITHUANIA AND RUSSIA
The state of Lithuanian-Russian relations until 2004 has been extensively analysed by 
Gediminas Vitkus (2006a; 2006b). Vitkus analysed the first fifteen years of independence by 
identifying the era’s main problems: negotiations regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Lithuania, issues of Russian military transit across Lithuania to and from Kaliningrad, 
and disputes concerning NATO enlargement, among other issues. Vitkus emphasized the 
complicated nature of the bilateral foreign relations between Lithuania and Russia and 
was sceptical about the possibility of normalizing these relations. During Lithuania’s early 
independence in the 1990s, it was difficult to imagine that Russia, which was perceived as 
Lithuania’s major threat, could disappear from Lithuania’s political consciousness and political 
practices. The only solution Vitkus proposed was that Lithuania, like all small countries in 
contemporary global politics, should pursue its goals by relying on international support. In 
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other words, he proposed that Lithuania constantly internationalize its bilateral relations 
(Jakniūnaitė, 2008). The historical analysis presented in the next section shows that only this 
internationalization practice produced successful results. 
Researchers also devoted their attention to the so-called Kaliningrad studies (Lopata, 
2002). Researchers considered the impact of the Kaliningrad oblast of the Russian Federation 
on Lithuania, analysed specific problems caused by the existence of this exclave, discussed the 
prospects of cooperation between Russia and Lithuania, and evaluated possibilities for the 
two countries to engage in economic integration (Lopata, and Sirutavičius, 1999). Lithuania’s 
relations with Kaliningrad haven’t been perceived as an immediate security challenge. Despite 
intense and difficult negotiations regarding military transits to Kalinin grad from 1993 to 
1995, (Laurinavičius, Lopata, and Sirutavičius, 2002) Kaliningrad raised more considerations 
regarding Lithuanian-Russian economic cooperation and interests. 
The region became a security concern when Lithuania began approaching EU 
membership: Kaliningrad began to be seen as a tool of Russian foreign policy for interfering 
with Lithuania’s Western integration processes (Sirutavičius, and Stanytė–Toločkienė, 2003). 
In this view, the issue was analysed in the context of EU-Russian (rather than Lithuanian–
Russian) relations, usually with analysts concluding that Russian domestic policy decisions 
determine the development prospects of countries in the region (Joenniemi, et al., 2000; 
Stanytė–Toločkienė, 2001). Analysts concluded that Russia held the region as a “geopolitical 
hostage” by emphasizing the region’s uniqueness while depriving the region of any practical 
realization of its unique qualities and paying only selective attention to Kaliningrad’s problems 
(Lopata, 2004). 
The third major field of research in Lithuania regarding Lithuania’s bilateral relations with 
Russia focused on the nexus between Lithuania’s foreign policy and identity. These analyses 
revealed the significant role of Russia in Lithuania’s political discourse and foreign policy 
decisions. These studies demonstrated that Lithuanian foreign policy is defined by a dilemma 
of sovereignty versus integration. That is, analysts showed that Lithuania is trying to transform 
its anti-Eastern Europe and anti-Russian stance into a pro-Western position without giving up 
its traditional nation state ideal or basing its policies on an obvious, real, and constant enemy: 
Russia (Miniotaitė, 1998; Miniotaitė, 2000; Miniotaitė, and Jakniūnaitė, 2001; Miniotaitė, 
2003).
There have been a few attempts to analyse Russia’s policies and actions towards Lithuania 
and other Baltic States. I endeavoured to understand Russia’s attitude toward the Baltic 
States, including Lithuania, by analysing Russia’s concept of neighbourhood (Jakniūnaitė, 
2007) and concluded that Russia has no clear concept of its borders, and thus its territory, 
which leads to a rather aggressive expansionist policy, albeit not clearly articulated, in its 
western neighbourhood. My study relied on a constructivist foreign policy interpretation. 
Laurinavičius, Motieka, and Statkus, applying the theory of geopolitical codes, claimed that 
Russian expansionism is inscribed in the country’s geopolitical position and history; therefore, 
Russia “will pose a potential threat for a long time,” requiring a constant need to “take steps 
to neutralize them [Russian threats]” (2005, p. 304).
A SMALL STATE IN THE ASYMMETRICAL BILATERAL RELATIONS... 73
Up until 2004, researchers tried to describe and analyse the two countries’ economic 
relations, and even rejoiced when these relations improved in terms of trade or transit volumes 
(Miškinis, 2000; Prunskienė, 2000). Others evaluated the effect of the EU’s enlargement on 
Lithuania’s foreign relations, noting an increase in Lithuania’s negotiating power, especially 
as Lithuania’s economic relationships would be shifted to the EU (Vilpišauskas, 2000). Since 
2000, researchers started to pay more attention to energy security issues by analysing 
Russia’s attempts to sustain its role in the energy sectors of its neighbouring countries and 
by addressing the security challenges related to Russia’s more assertive policies in the energy 
sector (see Šatūnienė, 2003; Smith, 2004).
Several Russian experts in a special issue of Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review (2000) 
focused on the issue of bilateral relations between Russia and Lithuania. When these experts 
tried to explain Russia’s attitude, they emphasized the challenges of an enlarged EU and 
NATO; and in this context they discussed Lithuanian “politicking.” These Russian experts 
seemed to resent a (then) new law on compensations for damages suffered during Lithuania’s 
Soviet occupation. Uncompromising Lithuanian politics were often mentioned by the Russian 
guest authors, but they made few comments on the politics of Russia except to emphasize 
the goodwill of both parties. (Trenin, 2000; Moshes, 2000; Avdeev, 2000; Kretinin, 2000; also 
Karabeshkin, 2003). These Russian-authored Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review articles did not 
present a detailed analysis of Lithuanian-Russian relations, but instead expressed opinions on 
the current matters.
Since 2004, there has been very little general or comprehensive research of Lithuanian-
Russian relations. Two articles provided a preliminary overview of Lithuania’s independence 
period, but the authors of these articles paid little attention to more recent times (Jakniunaite, 
and Vilpishauskas, 2012; Jakniūnaitė, Karabeshkin, Vilpišauskas, 2015). Despite the lack 
of general research on Lithuania-Russian relations since 2004, specific aspects of the two 
countries’ bilateral relations have been examined, including topics such as: identity analysis, 
energy security, memory politics, and EU issues relevant to Russia. Insights from these studies 
are referenced in the discussions of specific topics of Lithuania-Russian relations in this 
article. The results of the studies analysing the bilateral relations of Lithuania and Russia from 
Lithuania’s independence until 2004 are summarized below. 
1)  Lithuanian researchers seldom defined relations between Lithuania and Russia as 
friendly or cooperative—with the exception of some interpretations by Russian 
experts. Yet there is little discussion about or hopeful predictions that Lithuanian-
Russian relations will improve.
2)  The relationship between Russia and Lithuania is asymmetrical. Because of the 
disparity between Russia and Lithuania’s sizes and influences, Lithuania cannot change 
its relations with Russia alone. But most analysts expected that the relationship 
between the two would change as a result of Lithuania’s membership in international 
organizations. On the one hand, Russia will “reconcile” with Lithuania’s NATO 
membership; on the other hand, the EU (or even NATO) will improve Lithuania’s 
negotiating power, as illustrated during the negotiations over Kaliningrad’s civil transit 
and visa regime. 
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3)  The political elite of Lithuania, and most analysts, consider Russia a major security 
threat and support this claim with historical analogies and by referencing Russia’s 
foreign policies, domestic policies, and public statements.
4)  Russia is the significant and dangerous Other in Lithuania, and as such plays an 
important and sometimes decisive role in Lithuania’s domestic political debates.
As I focus in this article on the period after 2004, the four previous conclusions raise the 
following questions: 
1)  In what sense is it possible to talk about the development of Lithuanian-Russian 
bilateral relations? For example, how are they changing or staying unstably stable? 
2) How does Lithuania’s EU and NATO membership influence the asymmetry of 
Lithuanian-Russian relations? 
3)  What role does Russia play in Lithuanian domestic politics? What do Lithuanian 
representations of Russia reveal about Lithuanian identity and how do these 
representations transform or influence Lithuania’s domestic political practices?
2. DEFINING EVENTS IN LITHUANIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS FROM 2004 TO 2014
The first step in analysing the decade of bilateral relations is to identify the main events and 
phenomenon that define these relations. My review of the defining events in Lithuanian-
Russian relations since 2004 is based on visible criteria; it includes the topics and events that 
Lithuanian media and foreign policy decision makers discussed most. The review is presented 
as a chronological narrative and covers the points necessary for understanding the later 
section, which focuses on energy and memory in Lithuanian-Russian relations.
In the beginning of the decade spanning from 2000 to 2010, analysts were quite optimistic 
about Lithuanian-Russian relations. After a tense 2002 to 2003 period, when Russia openly 
opposed NATO memberships for the Baltic States (EU integration seemed less alarming to 
Russian politicians) (Jakniūnaitė, 2007), a relative calm ensued. In the beginning of 2004, 
Lithuania was preparing for EU and NATO accession and Russia was readying for presidential 
elections. In addition, in Lithuania and in the other Baltic states, there was a common belief 
that after the Euro–Atlantic integration, relations with Russia would improve; that it would 
be possible for the Baltic states to constructively cooperate with Russia and the EU (Ehin, 
and Berg, 2009). This belief is illustrated by the May, 1 2004 Seimas [Lithuanian parliament] 
foreign policy resolution to “actively participate in the formation of a mutually beneficial 
EU-Russian partnership” (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2004). At the time, Lithuanian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Antanas Valionis told diplomats residing in Lithuania, “Our goal . . 
. [is] Russian openness to Euro-Atlantic cooperation... it is necessary to promote and actively 
participate in the European Union and NATO’s dialogue with Russia. This dialogue is beneficial 
to Lithuania, but it must be transparent and based on common values. On this matter, we must 
continue with a pragmatic and cautious neighbourhood policy” (Valionis, 2004). A similar idea 
about Russia’s cooperation with the EU and NATO—based on common values—reappeared 
in the agreement among Lithuanian political parties on foreign policy (Agreement of Political 
Parties, 2004). 
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Ideas of promoting cooperation with Russia were quickly neutralized by the 2004 
presidential elections in Ukraine. Disputes and disagreements over the transparency of the 
2004 Ukrainian elections later led to the country’s Orange Revolution. Lithuanian President 
Valdas Adamkus, who had started his second term that summer, was actively involved in these 
events and, with Polish President Aleksandr Kwaśniewski, worked to resolve the Ukrainian 
electoral crisis (DELFI, 2004b). Some Lithuanian policy makers regarded the Orange Revolution 
as yet another sign of Russia’s relentless meddling in the affairs of neighbouring countries and 
another reason for Lithuanian vigilance regarding Russia’s actions and motives. 
So, the very end of 2004 marks the beginning of a period of open confrontation between 
Lithuania and Russia, embodied mainly through Adamkus’s categorically critical stance towards 
Russia. The critique was also closely related to Lithuania’s involvement in EU neighbourhood 
politics and the country’s support of integrationist policies in Eastern European countries. 
Next, in the beginning of 2005, the Lithuanian public debated whether their president 
should attend Moscow’s anniversary celebration of the victory over Nazi Germany. The 
president decided not to attend, but these debates indicate that it was almost impossible 
to talk of significantly improving relations with Russia. Lithuanians interpreted suggestions 
of reconciliation as a sign of allowing Russia to “become closer to us” or permitting Russia to 
“embrace us.” For many, reconciliation signified a closeness with Russia that could only lead 
to Lithuania returning to Russia’s sphere of influence (Jurgelevičiūtė, 2007; Janeliūnas, 2005). 
Such disputes also revealed the extent to which historical politics and incompatible national 
historical narratives have become an integral part of the bilateral relations between Lithuania 
and Russia.
Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, domestic problems, and efforts to centralize its political 
regime dashed its neighbours’ hopes for better relations with Russia. Lithuanian and the 
entire central eastern European region’s politicians were impacted by Russian President 
Vladimir Putin’s statement on May 2005; Putin announced that the Soviet Union’s collapse 
was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century (Putin, 2005). This statement 
established a direct relationship between Russia and the Soviet Union and provided a 
vocabulary for Russian discourse about the country’s Soviet past. Putin’s statement was a clear 
demonstration that Russia acknowledged its historical responsibility for the past (or at least its 
legacy). Putin was obviously not inclined to repeat that disaster he deemed the dissolution of 
the USSR to be; during his second term, Putin was asserting an image of Russia as a strong and 
great country, worthy of significant respect. Lithuania’s policy makers registered these moves 
and stumbled through bilateral relations with Russia.
In 2006, Lithuanian-Russian relations revolved around the sale of the Mažeikių nafta2 
oil refinery. Russia pressured the Lithuanian government to sell shares of Mažeikių nafta 
to Russia’s second largest oil company, Lukoil, arguing that this would ensure oil supplies 
to Lithuania. During the negotiations in July, Russian oil supplied to Lithuania through the 
Druzhba pipeline was suspended. According to an official statement, the supply suspension 
2 On September, 1 2009 Mažeikių nafta changed its name to ORLEN Lietuva, but is referred to as  Mažeikių 
nafta throughout this article.
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was due to a technical error. Despite the official statement of an error in the supply system, 
Lithuanians interpreted the suspension as Russian political pressure and a Russian attempt to 
prove that Mažeikių nafta would not last without Russia.3 
Eventually, at the end of 2006, PKN Orlen, a Polish company, became Mažeikių nafta’s 
major shareholder.4 The oil tensions of 2006 revealed another essential part of Lithuanian-
Russian bilateral relations: Lithuania’s almost absolute dependence on imported Russian oil 
and gas. Consequently, Lithuanians experienced persistent uncertainty and were keenly aware 
that Russia could manipulate their energy dependence for political reasons. Shortly after the 
2006 oil supply suspension, Lithuanians’ energy fears were heightened by gas supply crises 
in Ukraine in 2006, 2007, and 2009. Lithuania’s situation of almost absolute dependence on 
Russia for oil and gas was soon termed the energy security issue and has become an integral 
part of Lithuania’s foreign and security policies.5
Furthermore, 2006 was also the year when Lithuania could, for the first time, test the 
possibility of engaging with Russia as a part of the EU—in some sense Lithuanian-Russian 
relations had become a part of the Russian-EU relationship. On the one hand, this meant 
Lithuania needed to adopt general EU positions; on the other hand, it gave Lithuania the 
possibility to take part in the formation of those positions. Lithuania’s role in forming 
EU-Russian relations became apparent in 2006 when Poland vetoed negotiations over 
a mandate to draft a new EU-Russia partnership and cooperation agreement. Lithuania 
supported Poland’s veto by including the condition that cooperation between the EU and 
Russia would depend on Russia’s compliance with democratic values. Thus, for the first time, 
Lithuania’s bilateral concerns over Russia’s unfriendliness were manifestly transferred to the 
EU. Later strategies to Europeanize Lithuania’s relations with Russia have been increasingly 
applied and have been particularly successful in the energy sector.
Continuing with this strategy, in April 2008 Lithuania vetoed another revision of the EU-
Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997. The start of the negotiations on the 
new agreement required Russia to renew the Druzhba pipeline oil supply, join the EU Energy 
Charter, resolve conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, and cooperate in the legal proceedings and 
extraditions relating to the killing of Lithuanian civilians by Soviet troops in Medininkai in 1991 
and at the Vilnius television tower on January 13, 1991. After these conditions were included 
in the negotiation mandate, Lithuania withdrew its veto (Damulytė, 2008). As of 2015, no 
new partnership agreement exists (many no longer contemplate this possibility anymore). By 
demonstrating a lack of confidence in Russia, Lithuania certainly got Russia’s attention at the 
EU level in 2008. Though Lithuania’s stance was not startling news, (Lithuania’s scepticism of 
Russia was not surprising) it revealed that Lithuania, called the “New Cold Warrior” in 2007 
(Leonard, and Popescu, 2007), intended to live up to this moniker throughout the decade.
3 Oil supplies to Lithuania through the Druzhba pipeline were not renewed by October 2015.
4 It must be acknowledge that the deal was not just political: PKN Orlen‘s proposed price for Mažeikių nafta 
was twice that offered by Lukoil. Some speculated that the low price offered by Lukoil was influenced by their 
belief that their competitors would retreat because of uncertainty over the oil supply (Grigas, 2013).
5 The first time Lithuania‘s dependency on one energy importer (Russia) was called a threat was in the 2007 
National Energy Strategy (Resolution on the Approval of the National Energy Strategy, 2007).
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The year 2008 was a significant for yet another reason: the Georgian-Russian conflict 
took place in August 2008. Consequently, Georgia lost de facto two of its regions, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. In October, Lithuania’s political parties agreed on their foreign policy 
goals for the next four-year cycle. There was an evident change in the rhetoric of the new 
agreement, which was clearly affected by the events in Georgia. Their agreement stated, 
“After the conflict in the South Caucasus, there is a need for a new comprehensive analysis 
of the current geopolitical situation in the region and of the challenges to Lithuanian security 
and foreign policy” (Agreement of Political Parties, 2008). The agreement also mentioned 
the need for “more effective policies of NATO, the EU, and other international organizations 
with regard to the Russian Federation,” and “... that challenges arising out of the Russian 
Federation government’s policies should be properly considered in the EU and NATO” 
(Agreement of Political Parties, 2008). Thus, Lithuania’s ideas about a partnership with Russia 
and about promoting or consolidating cooperation with Russia were replaced with concerns 
for efficiency—there was a shift in Lithuania from a benevolent, optimistic position to a more 
neutral rhetoric, based on benefits and caution.
However, the West softened its stance towards Russia soon after the Georgian crises; 
the US even initiated its famous Russian reset policy. In Lithuania, meanwhile, President of 
Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė, elected in mid-2009, criticized Lithuania’s foreign policy turn 
towards its Eastern neighbours. During her election campaign and during her first term, 
Grybauskaitė talked of the need for a pragmatic and constructive approach towards Russia, 
based on national interests and balance, “The ultimate foreign policy goal of any country is 
to defend their country’s interests, maintain its dignity, and treat all neighbours with respect. 
So far, Lithuania behaves like a state lacking self confidence by trying to befriend some and 
ignoring others . . . I have our Eastern policy in mind, a policy of a former Soviet territory giving 
very little attention to Western Europe and European Union countries” (Lrytas.lt, 2009).
For some time in 2009, there were no harsher utterances against Russia. Europe and the 
United State’s relations with Russia were rather quickly normalized—although Lithuania was 
rather sceptical of the quick renewal of Russian-NATO relations in 2009. Grybauskaitė even 
surprised a number of foreign policy observers by calling Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
at the end of the summer of 2009. Theirs was the first official conversation between the 
Lithuanian and Russian presidents in eight years, since 2001. However, their conversation 
focused on general and rather technical topics such as transport companies and exporters and 
the broader prospects of the economic and cultural cooperation (President of the Republic of 
Lithuania, 2009). 
There were two more official meetings between leaders of both countries in 2010. In 
February, Grybauskaitė met with the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Helsinki “to 
develop a constructive dialogue” (President of the Republic of Lithuania, 2010). Lithuanian 
Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius met with Putin in March and the two engaged in talks about 
energy (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2010a) and historical research (Government 
of the Republic of Lithuania, 2010b), but did not reach any concrete agreements. These two 
meetings demonstrated, again, that two countries’ leaders have little to constructively discuss: 
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problems between the two countries were not meaningfully discussed. The two parties only 
recognized their different positions. 
Thus, from 2009 to 2010, meetings or conversations did not bring about any significant 
change in Lithuanian-Russian relations. It seems that 2009 was the calmest year between 
Russia and Lithuania, despite the periodic export hindrances on the Russian border that 
autumn (Dambrauskaitė, Kasčiūnas, and Sirijos Gira, 2009).6 The fact that the Lithuanian 
government was intent on solving the financial and economic crisis probably detracted 
Lithuania’s attention from foreign policy matters, including events in and relations with Russia. 
After 2010 it was clear that bilateral relations between Lithuania and Russia would not 
change and that Lithuania’s position towards Russia—both at the presidential and foreign 
affairs ministerial levels —would not differ much from that of former Adamkus. Yet, in 
October 2012, the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDP), which had the right to form a 
government coalition, declared before the elections that it “would reset relations with Russia” 
and “look forward to the future” (LSDP, 2012). The LSDP’s appointed Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Linas Linkevičius, stated, “We will not be advocates of Russia in Europe, but we cannot assume 
the prosecutor’s role as well. I see this ‘reset’... by no means as a revolution or an intention 
to change everything, but more as a natural ‘test’ of the system” (Veidas, 2013). Neither a 
systemic review nor any positive test of Lithuania’s relationship with Russia, however, occurred 
that year, or later.
In 2013, Lithuanian leaders intended to prepare for the presidency of the EU Council and 
to devote the second half of the year to the presidency itself. The most important event of 
2013 in Lithuania should have been the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit and the signing 
of the Association Agreement with Ukraine. However, days before the scheduled November 
2013 meeting, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych cancelled the signing. Ukrainians 
protested in response to Yanukovych’s decision. The protests turned into what was later 
called Euromaidan, mass rallies of dissent against Yanukovych’s decision, but also against the 
Ukrainian government. 
Throughout 2013, Russia was an important player in the negotiations between Ukraine 
and the EU. Eventually, Russia pressured Ukraine not to sign the Association Agreement 
and persuaded Ukraine to join Russia’s Eurasian Union. In the eyes of Russians, the events 
in Ukraine in 2014—including a government changeover and Yanukovych’s flight from the 
country—gave Russia the right to interfere in Ukrainian affairs, first by occupying Crimea and 
later by supporting separatist rebels in south-eastern Ukraine.
In 2014 Lithuanian politicians openly and harshly criticised Russia’s actions, particularly 
Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. In the Lithuanian political parties’ agreement regarding the 
strategic guidelines of Lithuanian foreign, security, and defence policies adopted in March 
2014, the parties expressed concern “over the challenges presented by Russia’s aggressive 
policy to the security of the world, Europe, and especially our region” (Agreement of Political 
Parties, 2014). In the agreement the parties also declared that “Russian revisionist policy in 
6 Since then similar problems at the border have become periodic, and were prominent in 2013 and in the 
autumn of 2014 Russian officials have attributed the problems in all of these cases to technical difficulties.
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central and Eastern Europe presents a major and prevailing foreign policy challenge and this 
Russian policy poses the main threat to Lithuanian national security” (Agreement of Political 
Parties, 2014). By the end of 2014, Grybauskaitė categorically called Russia a “terrorist state” 
(BNS, 2014). In 2014 there was more talk of military defence, with discussions focused on the 
probability of a Russian attack and the strength of NATO’s commitment to defend Baltic States.
This overview of events and processes demonstrates that bilateral relations between 
Lithuania and Russia deteriorated: recurring, and routinized problems were constantly restated 
and even seemingly new incidents were actually related to the same problematic categories 
that have defined Lithuanian-Russian relations for more than a decade. The overview also 
provides a sense of how the tensions between Russia and Lithuania came to be regarded as 
normal among Lithuanian foreign policy players.
Thus, this part of the article answered the first set of questions proposed previously: 
In what sense is it possible to talk about the development of Lithuanian-Russian bilateral 
relations? How are they changing or staying unstably stable? The events in Lithuanian-Russian 
bilateral relations are new manifestations of the same problem structures; in this sense, they 
stay stable—though stability is achieved through uncertainty surrounding where and how new 
annoyances will emerge. This condition is constituted by Lithuania’s approach towards Russia, 
but also by their asymmetrical relationship and Lithuania’s less advantageous position. In the 
next part of this article, I analyse how Lithuania’s foreign policy has attempted to change this 
structural condition. 
3. INTERNATIONALIZING BILATERAL RELATIONS BET WEEN LITHUANIA AND RUSSIA
The main structural or contextual change for Lithuanian foreign policy after 2004 was a 
structural and institutional change: Lithuania’s memberships in the EU and NATO created 
not only new constrains, but also provided new tools and possibilities. These memberships 
allowed Lithuania to develop its bilateral relations through multilateral frameworks by using 
its new institutional possibilities, procedures, and capabilities. Lithuania, in its relations with 
Russia, had been trying to maximize this internationalizing strategy. In this part of the article, 
I reveal how and when Lithuania’s internationalizing strategy works by analysing two main 
challenges for Lithuania’s bilateral relations with Russia: energy politics disagreements and 
differing politics of history. 
3 . 1  E n e r g y  S e c u r i t y
During the entire decade spanning from 2004 to 2014, Lithuania’s dependency on Russian 
oil and gas was almost absolute. After the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant closed at the end 
of 2009, all of Lithuania’s gas came from Russia and Belarus.7 As early as 2000, Russia was 
beginning to use its economy for political purposes—a so-called economization of foreign 
7 See National Energy Strategy 2007 (Resolution on the Approval of the National Energy Strategy, 2007) and 
the National Energy Independence Strategy 2012 (Resolution on the Approval of the National Independence 
Energy Strategy, 2012).
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policy—by emphasizing the defence of its economic interests and using its big companies 
(particularly its energy companies) in foreign policy games (Bugajski, 2004). 
Lithuania’s worries about the stability of energy imports from Russia increased when 
Russia cited technical difficulties and suspended oil imported through its Druzhba pipeline in 
the summer of 2006. The periodic Russian gas crises in Ukraine and Europe in 2006, 2007, and 
2009 also intensified Lithuania’s energy security worries. Also, from 2006 to 2010, Lithuania 
lived through energy shocks when the price of gas rose from 85 USD/tcm in 2005 to 345 USD/
tcm in 2008 (Balmaceda, 2013, p. 242). This price increase was not due to market tendencies 
alone; it was also due to political disagreements between Lithuania and Russia. 
Until 2010, Lithuania was the country gas transited through on its way from Russia to 
Kaliningrad and this gave Lithuania some leverage in disagreements regarding energy 
imports. But this transit card lost its value when Nordstream, an offshore gas pipeline started 
functioning. Extending from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea, Nordstream now 
provides gas to Kaliningrad, making the exclave almost entirely independent from Lithuanian 
infrastructure for its energy imports. 
Lithuania’s increasing fears regarding energy dependency were reflected in its official 
documents. In 2007, Lithuania’s National Energy Strategy stated that Lithuania’s dependency 
on one gas and oil supplier—Russia—is a national security threat and the new 2012 version 
of the strategy was called the National Energy Independence Strategy (Resolution on the 
Approval of the National Energy Strategy, 2007; Resolution on the Approval of the National 
Independence Energy Strategy, 2012). In this way, from 2007 to 2008, Lithuania’s energy 
dependency is more and more assertively regarded as a security concern and the most 
urgent and the state’s most important problem. Around this time, energy became integral to 
Lithuania’s foreign policies. 
Several projects have been started or implemented to reduce Lithuania’s energy 
insecurity, including: a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Klaipeda, plans to build 
electricity interconnectors with Sweden and Poland, and plans for a new nuclear power plant 
in Visaginas—though by the autumn of 2015, there was still no decision as to whether the 
plant would be started at all. Not all of Lithuania’s energy projects are directly connected 
to Lithuanian-Russian relations, but all are about increasing energy security, which allows 
Lithuania to distance itself from Russia as much as possible.
The first time Lithuania tried to address its problems with Russia as an EU member state, 
with increased power to pressure Russia, was in 2006 when Lithuania was trying to sell 
Mažeikių nafta and solve the Druzhba oil pipeline problem. Prompted to act by Lithuania and 
Poland, President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso questioned the security 
of oil supplies to Mažeikių nafta during a meeting between the EU and Russia on May 2007. 
Lithuania’s 2008 veto of the negotiation mandate between the EU and Russia was also related 
to the cessation of the Druzhba pipeline. Although the EU paid attention to this requirement 
and included the problem in its list of questions to be discussed, no decisions or agreement 
was reached and the negotiations were generally unsuccessful. But Lithuania’s 2008 veto 
mattered—it became absolutely obvious that Lithuania had almost no independent leverage 
in its bilateral relations with Russia and could only influence Russia through the EU. 
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Lithuania was more successful in internalizing (or Europeanizing) its energy relations with 
Russia in its conflict with Russian gas supplier Gazprom, which, since 2010, is Lithuania’s only 
gas supplier. In 2009 Lithuania decided to fully implement the third EU energy package to 
unbundle supply, transit, and distribution in the Lithuanian gas sector. Lithuania sought to 
restructure the gas market to reduce Gazprom’s influence as much as possible and hoped 
to require Gazprom to refuse ownership of gas pipelines in Lithuania. The details of the 
implementation of the package are bureaucratic and technical and the dispute is actually about 
the commercial interests and resolutions between a large company and a state. However, 
because of Gazprom’s close ties to Russia’s ruling elite, this conflict played a significant role in 
Lithuanian-Russian bilateral relations. 
In January 2011, Lithuania issued a formal complaint with the European Commission 
claiming that Gazprom was abusing its dominant position. In September 2012, the European 
Commission decided to investigate whether the company “might be hindering competition 
in Central and Eastern European gas markets, in breach of EU antitrust rules” (European 
Commission, 2012). The fight with Gazprom started in Lithuanian courts, which prompted 
Gazprom to go the Stockholm Court of Arbitration to “bar the Lithuanian courts to make [from 
making] a decision on a case that will investigate the operations of Lithuanian Gas” (Lithuania 
Tribune, 2011). By October 2012, Lithuania initiated its case against Gazprom in the same court 
in Stockholm. The disagreement was about an estimated 5 billion litas (approximately 1,450 
billion euros) in overpayments made to Gazprom for gas supplied to Lithuania in accordance 
with bilateral agreements (BNS, 2012d). 
Gazprom’s response was indirect: Lithuania did not receive any discount for the gas and in 
2013 was paying the highest gas price in the EU, 540 USD/tcm (Balmaceda, 2013, p. 253). This 
court saga continued until the end of 2015 when the object of the disagreements eventually 
disappeared. In 2014, the Lithuanian gas sector was divided and Gazprom was practically 
forced to leave the Lithuanian gas distribution system. Gazprom is still pressured, though, at 
the EU level. 
Thus, we can see that by applying its internalization strategy—the proper use of the 
EU’s acts and regulations, and knowledge of the institutional game—to its energy questions, 
Lithuania achieved relatively successful results. While Lithuania’s internalization strategy did 
not improve or change its relations with Russia, Lithuania did manage to reach some of its 
goals, which most probably would have been unattainable otherwise.
3 . 2  Po l i t i c s  o f  H i s t o r y
A different strategy was applied to Lithuania’s discussions over historical questions—instead 
of leveraging EU membership and institutional support, Lithuania formed partnerships and 
built or joined coalitions with like-minded EU member states. 
Lithuania’s disagreements with Russia over history focused mainly on two issues: 
1) Russia’s acknowledgement, or lack of acknowledgement, of the Soviet occupation of 
Lithuania and Lithuania’s demand for Russian compensation for damages caused during the 
occupation; and 2) Lithuania’s denouncement of the crimes of Stalinism and of Soviet symbols. 
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Lithuania’s efforts to internationalize the first issue were unsuccessful; but Lithuania achieved 
a favourable, though still symbolic, result by joining a coalition to address the second issue. 
Lithuania and Russia’s positions regarding the issue of Lithuania’s Soviet occupation and 
Lithuania’s demand for compensation for damages suffered during the occupation are clear. 
Lithuania holds that as it was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940, Russia—as the Soviet 
Union’s successor state—should officially apologize to and financially compensate Lithuania. 
Lithuania put these two demands on its political agenda almost immediately after declaring 
independence from the USSR in 1990. Lithuania then legitimized its claims in a referendum 
in June 14, 1992, demanding “The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the troops of 
the former USSR, which by the time of the referendum belongs to Russia, from the territory of 
Lithuania in 1992 and compensation for the damages to Lithuania.”  Of Lithuania’s registered 
voters, 69 per cent—and 92.6 per cent those who voted—agreed with the referendum 
proposition (Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 1992). Lithuanian 
negotiators unsuccessfully tried to raise this compensation issue with Russia while negotiating 
the removal of Russian (former Soviet) troops in 1993. After some pause, the issue became an 
active part of Lithuania’s agenda in 2000. In June of that year, the Seimas followed Vytautas 
Landsbergis’ initiative and adopted the Law on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the 
Occupation by the USSR (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2000), according to which the 
Lithuanian government was obliged to calculate its occupation-related damages and start 
compensation negotiations with Russia8. 
On a bureaucratic level, the process of calculating damages and negotiating compensation 
stayed alive—calculations were provided and the issue was periodically raised in various 
intergovernmental meetings—but on a political level, it was not emphasized. The LSDP tried to 
avoid the issue entirely. The domestic debates about this issue intensified during discussions 
on whether President Adamkus should go to Moscow to celebrate the 50th anniversary of 
Victory day in 2005. The conservative the Homeland Union—Lithuanian Christian Democrats 
Party (TS-LKD) usually opposed raising the compensation issue, but since becoming a part of the 
ruling coalition in 2008, the Party changed its position and supported seeking compensation 
for occupation related damages at the end of its term (BNS, 2012c; Karaliūnaitė, 2012).
For Russia, all the talk of compensation and occupation appeared to be a Lithuanian 
effort to complicate its bilateral relations with Lithuania. According to Russia’s historical 
interpretation, Lithuania was not occupied by the USSR; Lithuania was voluntarily incorporated 
into the Soviet Union. Thus, Russia immediately eliminated Lithuania’s efforts to even start a 
8 Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the law indicate that the Government of the Republic of Lithuania has to: 
“prior to November 1, 2000 appeal to the Russian Federation for the compensation of the damage caused dur-
ing the period of the USSR occupation, submitting the calculations of damage, also inform the United Nations 
Organisation, the Council of Europe and the European Union about this, and constantly seek the support of 
these Organisations and the Member States thereof when solving the issues of the compensation of the USSR 
occupation damage to Lithuania,” and “initiate negotiations and constantly seek that the Russian Federation 
compensate to the Lithuanian people and the State of Lithuania for the damage caused by the USSR occupation.” 
(Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2000)
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discussion on the issue. For Russia, the case was closed: this issue should not exist neither on 
a political nor on an expert level, a position Putin reasserted in 2005.
Please take a look at the resolution passed by the Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989, 
where it is written, black on white, that the Congress of People’s Deputies denounces the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and considers it legally invalid. It did not reflect the opinion of 
the Soviet people but was the personal affair of Stalin and Hitler. How can we be more clear 
and precise on this point? Or would you rather that we repeated these words every year? 
What do you think, what more can we say? We think that this question is closed. I will not 
come back to it. We expressed our view once and that is enough (President of Russia, 2005).
Thus, not only are the positions of Lithuania and Russia in total opposition regarding the 
Soviet occupation of Lithuania and consequent issues, it is hard for Lithuania to get international 
support for its compensation demands. There were no similar legal precedents; besides, no 
other former Soviet republic or so-called Eastern bloc country has demanded compensation 
for damages suffered during the occupation (Jurgelevičiūtė, 2006; Jurgelevičiūtė, 2012). 
Understandably, it is unlikely that Russia will offer Lithuania concessions—developments in 
Lithuania’s favour would open a Pandora’s box for Russia. Thus, in recent times, the occupation 
issue has become more of a domestic issue—simply a matter of “politicking,” not a problem 
likely to be resolved constructively. 
Central European countries’ (CEE) efforts (especially those of Poland and the Czech 
Republic, Lithuanian representatives joined later) to start discussions about the crimes of 
Stalinism were more successful than Lithuania’s attempts to receive compensation for damages 
incurred during the Soviet occupation. The goal of the CEE countries was to criminalize the 
period of Stalin’s rule and condemn denials of Stalinist crimes, much as the denials of Nazi 
crimes are condemned. Lithuania cannot claim any exceptional merit for the results of these 
efforts, but its representatives joined a variety of initiatives. For example, Landsbergis joined 
the 2008 Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism, which proposed 
commemorating August 23 as a European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism 
and Nazism (Roszkowski et al., 2008). The proposal was quickly supported by the European 
Parliament (European Parliament, 2008). However, a 2010 report written by the European 
Commission, The Memory of the Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes in Europe, stated 
that the differing positions of the member states on the issue made it impossible to reach any 
agreement at the EU level (European Commission 2010). 
These declarations and decisions are mostly symbolic. Discussions on history at the EU level 
are developing very discreetly and with a lot of consideration. Still, the aforementioned actions 
angered Russia and Russia tried to discredit and respond to them with its own initiatives in the 
international frameworks available, such as OSCE and the UN General Assembly. For example, 
Russia pushes yearly resolutions in the UN General Assembly regarding the “celebration 
of Nazism” in the Baltic States. Overall, the victory over Nazi Germany is one of the most 
important historical events of the twentieth century for Russia. This victory is now a sacral 
part of Russia’s contemporary identity, just as the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is integral 
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to Lithuania’s contemporary identity. So, any comparisons of the Soviet regime with Nazi 
regime are taboo in Russia and likely will continue to be for a long time. So, virtual successes 
in differing historical narratives are relative and without a clear winner for the time being, 
even if there are a few allies and friends on Lithuania’s side.
4. MEASURING THE PRESENCE OF RUSSIA IN LITHUANIA
One of the defining features of Lithuanian foreign policy is acceptance of the fateful fact 
that Lithuania is close to Russia, a neighbour that poses a constant threat to Lithuania. The 
entire 2004 to 2014 decade was marked, directly and indirectly, by this constant reminder of 
Russia’s proximity. Despite the countries’ (not always constructive) efforts to communicate, 
Lithuania has to constantly remember that it cannot trust Russia and that Russia was, and will 
likely remain, the main threat to Lithuanian security. This condition necessitates an analysis 
of Lithuania’s internal perceptions, representations, and debates about Russia in Lithuania. 
Thus, in this part of the article, I strive to answer two questions: 1) How present is Russia 
in Lithuania? And, 2) what kind of Russia does Russia’s presence in Lithuania represent? To 
answer these questions, I analysed Lithuanian opinion polls, party and political divisions in 
Lithuania, and Lithuanian representations of Russia.
A review of opinion polls provides one way of revealing Lithuanian perceptions of a 
constant and contextual Russian threat in Lithuania. Unfortunately, periodic and comparable 
opinion polls about Lithuanians’ attitudes regarding Lithuanian foreign policy and its bilateral 
relations with Russia do not exist and I cannot speculate about changes in Lithuanians’ 
perceptions and beliefs regarding this matter. Publicly accessible polls are sporadic, cannot be 
compared, and do not allow statistically significant inferences to be made about Lithuanians’ 
opinions about Russia. Hence, I analysed opinion polls from a different angle and directed my 
attention to the questions pollsters asked and the answers the public gave. From this angle, 
the polls reveal a lot about the political agenda in Lithuania and the steering of this agenda. A 
summary of the relevant opinion polls is provided in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Opinion polls about Russia or relations with Russia conducted in Lithuania from 2004 
to 2014
Date Pollster Results
2004 Spinter
(DELFI, 2004a) 
Russian politics are not friendly towards Lithuania: 53%
I agree with the politics of the government regarding relations with Russia: 
57% 
2006 Vilmorus and TSPMI
(Ramonaitė, 
Maliukevičius, and 
Degutis, 2007)
Russia is a threat: 60% 
2009 Pew Research Center
(Pew Research Center, 
2009) 
The influence of Russia is good: 22%
The influence of Russia is bad: 39% 
(For comparison: the influence of the EU is good: 62%)
Lithuania‘s dependence on Russian energy resources is concerning: 61%. 
Russia can become a trusted ally (of Lithuania): 18% 
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2011 Pew Research Center
(Pew Research Center, 
2011) 
Respondents that look at Russia favourably: 53%
Respondents that look at Russia unfavourably: 42% 
(for comparison: participants with favourable view towards the US: 73% 
and participants with a favourable view towards the EU: 78%) 
2011 Vilmorus
(Elta, 2011) 
Respondents that noticed positive changes in bilateral relations between 
Lithuania and Russia: 41%
The most important issue in Lithuania and Russia‘s relations is energy 
security: 53%
The most important issue in Lithuania and Russia‘s relations is respect and 
equality between two countries: 46%
2011
No-
vem-
ber
Spinter and DELFI
(Černiauskas, 2012) 
It is important to have cheap electricity and gas, even if it would mean 
depending on Russia for energy: 62.9% 
It is important, at any price, to be free from energy dependence on Russia: 
25.3%
Independence is more important than the welfare of the state: 20.1%
The welfare of the state is more important than independence: 70,4%
Lithuania should stay silent and should not hurt bilateral trade relations 
with Russia: 42%
Lithuania must defend democratic values and criticise human rights 
violations: 27.5% 
2012 
Janu-
ary
Prime Consulting and 
Veidas
(BNS, 2012a) 
The most important for issue for Lithuania is to improve relations with 
Russia: 37%
Lithuania has to improve its cooperation with Scandinavian countries: 
17.8%
Lithuania has to seek the greater unity among the Baltic States: 16.6% 
2012 
May
Spinter and DELFI
(BNS, 2012b)
Now that Vladimir Putin is the president of Russia, relations between 
Lithuania and Russia will not change: 48%
2014 
March
Prime consulting and 
Veidas
(Veidas, 2014) 
Russia will attempt to occupy all, or part, of Lithuania: 87% (The 
respondents were inhabitants of Lithuania‘s largest cities.) 
2014 
March
Spinter and DELFI
(Černiauskas, 2014) 
Relations with Russia are mostly harmed by:
(It was possible to choose more than one answer.)
– economic blackmail by Russia: 46.3%
– unwarranted statements by Lithuanian politicians: 43.7%
– aggressive rhetoric of Russia towards Lithuania: 38.3%
– historical grievances: 32%
– actions of Russia against other countries: 28.4%
Relations would be improved by:
(It was possible to choose more than one answer.)
– proper gas prices: 39.4%
– a moderate stance among Lithuanian politicians: 36.9%
– another person as Russian president: 25%
– another person as Lithuanian president: 15%
– It is impossible to improve relations: 18.3%
Should Lithuania have warmer relations with Russia:
– Yes, because Lithuania is too small: 32.7%
– Yes, because Lithuania would receive cheap gas: 12.2%
– No, because of the Ukrainian events: 37.8% 
2014 
Sep-
tember
Spinter and DELFI
(Samoškaitė, 2014) 
If Russia decides to use military aggression against Lithuania, Lithuania 
could resist without NATO for 1 to 2 days: 44.6%
If Russia decides to use military aggression against Lithuania, Lithuania 
could resist without NATO for a week: 16%
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The data reveals several trends. First, the most of the respondents perceived poor 
relations between Lithuania and Russia and participants perceived Russia as a threat to 
Lithuania. This trend is relatively consistent from 2004 to 2014. Second, many know about or 
have heard of Lithuania’s energy dependence issues. Third, the participants’ opinions, both 
about concessions between the two states and about the possibility for Lithuania to change 
its situation with Russia, vary. Up until the beginning of 2014, public opinion on the traditional 
dichotomy between a state’s security and welfare sided with welfare. Most respondents 
agreed that it was better for Lithuanian to pursue a moderate foreign policy with Russia for 
cheaper gas (from 2008 to 2010, economic issues were more acute because of the economic 
crisis). Fourth, even though respondents were critical of and sceptical towards Russia, many 
were also critical of Lithuanian politicians and their rhetoric. Even in March 2014, after Russia 
occupied Crimea, a substantial number of respondents believed that Lithuania’s relations with 
Russia could change if Lithuania would change its discourse with Russia.
Thus, opinion polls demonstrate that Lithuanians perceive bad relations between Lithuania 
and Russia and usually no not doubt the possibility of a Russian threat or Russian blackmailing. 
But, it is possible to infer from these polls that with less tension and a better geopolitical 
situation, much of the population would prefer to desecuritize relations with Russia. Though, 
some Lithuanians would insist that any softening of the relations between their country and 
Russia would result in an even greater threat. 
The positions of Lithuania’s political parties also reflect the population’s division between 
moderate and wary positions towards Russia. At one end of this spectrum, the TS-LKD 
talks constantly of Russian dangers, demands that Russia deal with its history and admit its 
mistakes, and critiques Russia’s current political regime (Tėvynės Sąjunga, 2007). At the other 
end of the spectrum, the LSDP and the Labour Party (DP) have adopted a more moderate or 
pragmatic stance towards Russia.9 They tend to talk about Lithuanian-Russian relations by 
emphasizing Lithuania’s business and economic interests, while also pointing to the futility 
of confrontational politics (LSDP, 2012). Of course, the spectrum of opinions is varied. For 
example, some agree that Russia poses a threat to Lithuania, but disagree with the rhetoric 
parties use to discuss Lithuanian-Russian relations. Others reason that because Lithuania is a 
small country, it should not annoy a bigger and more powerful country. 
It should be noted that in practice, throughout Lithuanian-Russian relations, a particular 
position towards Russia has not mattered much: no Lithuanian political party has been any 
more successful than another in changing Lithuania’s relations with Russia. Confrontational 
politicians have inevitably become more moderate after becoming a part of the Lithuanian 
government, and so-called moderates could not be too lenient on Russia either because of 
opposition pressure or because they could not get anything from accommodative political 
strategies. 
The third aspect of this discussion about Russia in Lithuania is an analysis of Russia as 
a rhetorical device in public discussions. For example, in July 2011 Austria caught and 
9 There is also an openly pro-Russian leader of the Polish minority party, the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithu-
ania, which in 2012 and 2013 was part of the ruling coalition.  The party‘s influences mainly the Polish-speaking 
and some of the Russian-speaking populations of Lithuania.
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quickly released the former commander of the Soviet Alpha Group, retired KGB Colonel 
Mikhail Golovatov, who was wanted in Lithuania for alleged war crimes committed in Vilnius 
on January 13, 1991. Lithuanians’ public and very emotional discussion of Golotov’s 2011 
release and their condemnations of Austria made it clear that the Lithuanian public sphere’s 
assessment of Russia is enduring: Russia is still the main Other; though the country’s role has 
changed and it now acts in more subtly, such as by creating divisions between EU member 
states (Lingevičius, 2015).
The official Lithuanian security and foreign policy documents reveal the same tendencies 
of Lithuania’s public rhetoric regarding Russia. While there is a declaration to engage Russia 
in mutually beneficial cooperative efforts with the West, the more noticeable theme of these 
documents is that Russia’s action worry Lithuania. Officials are concerned about Russian-
initiated integrationist projects, their efforts to further strengthen the Russian armed forces, 
and Russia’s use of energy exports for political gain in neighbouring countries (Jurgelevičiūtė, 
2015).
Many domestic political scandals in Lithuania in the ten-years of EU and NATO memberships 
were connected in one way or another to Lithuanian politicians’ direct or vicarious relationship 
with Russia. Such was the case that eventually resulted in the impeachment of President 
Rolandas Paksas. In a variety of media stories—ranging from those about Russian born 
Lithuanian entrepreneur and politician Viktor Uspaskich, to investigations of State Security 
Department activities, to media discussions about shale gas or the new nuclear power plant, 
and even coverage of teachers’ strikes—Russia was not only mentioned, but was presented as 
an active, and at least partially involved, character. 
In the context of this analysis it is not relevant to prove or disprove such statements, or 
their veracity. Yet it is worthwhile to repeat Vitkus, who in 2006 wrote, “Self-critical debates 
about what kind of tactic is better for Lithuania in its relations with Russia should be seen 
not as something that could somehow substantially change the quality of the relations, but 
more as a political show which is steered by the demands of the domestic politics” (Vitkus, 
2006a, p. 172). Russia is not only the significant Other in Lithuanian foreign policy, but Russia 
is inseparable from Lithuania’s political discourse and political processes. 
CONCLUSION
2014 is the year when it became absolutely clear that Lithuania took notice of an obvious 
and openly demonstrated Russian aggression. Thus, Lithuania’s post-integration decade, from 
2004 to 2014, ended quite pessimistically if considered in the context of Lithuanian-Russian 
relations. Now, at the end of 2015, it is still unclear how long confrontations between the 
West and Russia will last. A lack of resolution also persists in Ukraine where analysts can 
only speculate about the future of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, when concessions will be 
made, or how the crisis will be resolved. Thus, Lithuanian-Russian relations are poor: there is 
no communication at the political level; and there are very few ideas for improving relations 
with the current regime in Russia. 
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Of course, this situation was not always so dire. Even though Lithuania’s independence 
story and its concept of statehood is inseparable from both its history with Russia and from 
its perception of Russia as a constant danger, there were several periods when Lithuanian 
politicians publicly attempted to reach agreements with Russia. On the other hand, talk of 
Lithuanian-Russian agreements and cooperation was, very often, insubstantial, politically 
expedient rhetoric formulated to create a resolute, principled position, and to demonstrate 
caution towards Russia. 
The analysis also demonstrates substantial reasons to doubt that Russia would help 
improve its bilateral relations with Lithuania. Aside from several mutual infrastructural 
projects developed in the Kaliningrad and Lithuanian region bordering Kaliningrad, Russia has 
constantly demonstrated indifference, irritation, and discontent in response to Lithuanian 
actions or remarks. Without Russia’s contribution it is impossible to change Lithuanian-Russian 
relations. Besides, the relations are very much influenced by the dynamics of Russian-US and 
Russian-EU relations, but developments in Russia’s relations with the US and the EU are not 
usually connected to Lithuania’s goals and interests, and sometimes even undermine them. 
The might and danger Russia poses presents a structural inequality: Russia’s relations with 
Lithuania are not, nor can they be, symmetrical. Lithuania can bolster its small size and relative 
weakness only by internationalizing its foreign relations concerns through the EU and NATO. 
The main tensions between Lithuania and Russia result from conflicting interpretations of 
shared historical experiences, asymmetrical access to energy resources, and in their differing 
interpretations of regional security and of Russia’s appropriate role in regional security. 
Lithuania and Russia’s mutual distrust prevents the two countries from discussing sensitive 
topics and from trusting each other’s motives. Their shared distrust also creates a situation in 
which any analysis of their bilateral relations reveals recurring problems, these battles over 
the main tensions mentioned above also recur in the foreign and security policies of the two 
states. 
Thus, in this analysis of Lithuania’s relations with Russia from 2004 to 2014, I presented an 
undefined and inconvenient status quo, which has been, more or less, acceptable to Russia. If 
Lithuania would care to change its relations with Russia, it must cooperate with other states 
or try to influence the EU and NATO’s policy decisions. Any direct changes to the relationship 
between Lithuania and Russia can only be initiated by Russia. The extent to which changes 
in the Lithuanian-Russian relationship are plausible must be assessed in light of the fact 
that Russia—in current and historical Lithuanian statehood narratives—is the primary, and 
a dangerous, Other. Thus, these relations do not allow Lithuania to develop trust in Russia, 
neither at a political level, nor in Lithuania’s public discourse. Thus Lithuanian-Russian bilateral 
relations have been, and will remain, in a condition of cold stability.
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